Anduril Industries, Lattice Monitoring Plane (Telefonica ARO Grafana), Disclosure Sent, Awaiting Acknowledgment

NuClide Research · 2026-05-08 (sent 2026-05-09)

Status: Disclosure sent to disclosures@anduril.com on 2026-05-09 (GPG-encrypted to fingerprint 67EE B1A4 05BF 0A0A F0A7 EB35 5477 1229 1AE1 D9DF per their published security.txt). This redacted case study is published; full IP-level operational detail (cluster inventory, per-tier cert SANs, targeted Shodan dorks for individual production tiers) is held in the disclosure pack and will be added to the public artifact only after Anduril acknowledges and a reasonable remediation window has passed.

What This Documents

A focused investigation of Anduril’s Lattice infrastructure that surfaced 5 verified findings (2 HIGH, 1 MEDIUM, 2 LOW, all configuration hygiene, none critical), 5 items surfaced for the team’s judgment, and 1 unverified prior-session claim that did not hold up on re-test.

DCWF KSAT coverage

Auto-derived from DCWF AI work-role rule files (ksat-tag).

• 672 (AI Test & Evaluation Specialist): K7003, K7004, K7044, S7068, S7070, S7075, T5904, T5919
• 733 (AI Risk & Ethics Specialist): K7051, T5868, T5893
• overlap (Common AI KSATs (all 5 roles)): K1158, K1159, K22, K6311, K6900, K6935, K7003, K7048

The point of including this in the public OSINT repo is methodological: it shows what not to do (the prior-session claim that didn’t survive verification) and it documents that defense-contractor targets are handled differently from commercial-cloud surveys.

Verified Findings (Detail in Disclosure Pack, Not Public)

F2. HIGH: Telefonica ARO Grafana. Anonymous Datasource Inventory

A Grafana instance running on a Telefonica-managed Azure Red Hat OpenShift cluster, referenced in the Lattice Developer Platform’s CSP frame-src, returns the full datasource configuration to unauthenticated requests via /api/datasources.

The exposed inventory references Lattice-specific naming (a Prometheus datasource called lattics-bsidp, i.e. Lattice Backstage IDP), confirming this is part of the Anduril monitoring plane even though the Grafana sits on Telefonica’s infrastructure.

The exposure includes internal Kubernetes service URLs, three plain-HTTP backends in Azure commercial East US, and a PostgreSQL endpoint (auth-protected at the application layer). Full inventory is in the disclosure pack.

Owner: Telefonica (operator). Anduril notified to coordinate.

F3. HIGH: Systemic Private-IP Leakage Across andurildev.com Route53 Zone

A passive DNS sweep of 157 unique subdomains under andurildev.com (sourced from public certificate transparency data) shows 44 (28%) resolve to RFC-1918 private IP addresses in public DNS. The leak spans the zone, not a one-off, and exposes multiple distinct internal subnets across at least nine internal address ranges, including the AI/ML data plane, multiple SIE cluster environments, the Crucible CI/CD cluster, customer/partner demo subnets, and the Maritime ASV’s separate 172.16-prefixed network.

The fix is at the zone level (audit + move RFC-1918 records to a private hosted zone), not per-record. Full enumeration with subnets and per-subdomain mapping is in the disclosure pack.

Owner: Anduril.

Why this is impactful: The internal subnet allocation strategy is partitioned by tier (observability, secrets, data, AI, SIE, customer-demo) at /19–/20 granularity. From an attacker’s perspective, knowing which internal subnet hosts which workload class materially shortens the kill chain if any internal foothold is later obtained. A benefit Anduril’s defenders would prefer to deny.

F-NEW-2. MEDIUM: Self-Signed localhost Cert Auto-Renewing on 3 Public Lattice Deployments

Three publicly-reachable Lattice login pages (across Microsoft / Oracle / Cloudflare hosting providers) present a self-signed certificate with Issuer/Subject: O=Anduril, L=Costa Mesa, CN=localhost. The cert is rotated by automation on a regular cadence. One of the three was rotated to a fresh cert during this investigation, and the new cert was still the same broken CN=localhost template. This is a deployment-template + cert-renewal-automation defect, not a one-time mistake.

Owner: Anduril.

F-NEW-3. LOW: fleet.internal cert SAN on 2 AWS GovCloud Hosts

Two AWS GovCloud Lattice hosts serve a cert with CN=fleet-core-toc.fleet.internal. The internal namespace + service identity are leaked in CT logs and to anyone connecting to port 443. Same root cause as F-NEW-2.

Owner: Anduril.

F-NEW-4. LOW: AKM Internal-ALB Names Exposed via Public DNS CNAMEs

Two *.akm.anduril.com subdomains CNAME to internal-altius-key-store-mfgops-*.us-gov-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com (AWS internal-only ALBs). The IPs aren’t externally routable, but the internal LB names + AKM operational-tier naming (mfgops / eudops) + AWS GovCloud-EAST region are now public. AKM = Altius Key Manager. Encryption key infrastructure for the Altius loitering-munition program.

Owner: Anduril. Same fix class as F3.

Items Surfaced (Not Findings)

• http://route-ytterbic-canidae-openshift-operators.apps.telefonica.centralus.aroapp.io appears in the Backstage CSP as a plain-HTTP frame-src. Currently 503; not exploitable as observed. Surfaced to Anduril for CSP audit.
• Certificate Transparency naming: the andurildev.com cert SAN surface in CT logs uses program codenames, customer identifiers, and (in two cases observed) classification-level labels. Public by RFC 6962 design. Not a security finding. Surfaced for ITAR information-control review at Anduril’s discretion. Specific entries listed in the disclosure pack.
• Okta OIDC discovery at dev-okta.developer.anduril.com and login.developer.anduril.com lists password grant_type, implicit flow, and none token_endpoint_auth_method as supported. These are Okta tenant-level defaults (advertised capability ≠ per-app enablement), but worth Anduril’s identity team confirming no production app actually has these enabled.
• Klas Telecom Government / Voyager OEM relationship is publicly disclosed via a redirect rule in armory.anduril.com’s JavaScript bundle (/voyager-support → klasgroup.com/support). If the OEM relationship is intended to be customer-only knowledge, route the redirect server-side instead of client-side.
• Palantir Workshop module ID (f8c05d84-ac01-4a9b-8a9e-9cbc401d2cf8) is in the public 302 Location header from customerportal.anduril.com → alpha.palantirgov.com. Stable Palantir RID. Accessible to anyone with credentials on the alpha tenant.

A Prior Claim That Did Not Verify

A prior session claim that the Backstage instance at 20.106.9.145 was leaking the internal service catalog via unauthenticated /api/catalog/entities did not verify on re-test. The endpoint returns HTTP 500 with a server-side error log ID, not catalog data. The prior session likely hit a User-Agent-gated middleware redirect and misread the result.

This is documented here as a self-correction, and is the reason the disclosure does not include a “Backstage public mode” finding. The 500 logIds were surfaced to Anduril for their own review (the error indicates a backend issue, not necessarily a security one).

Methodology note: Re-verify single-session claims before they propagate. The advisor pattern caught this one.

Public Lattice Developer API Context

Anduril operates a public developer API at https://developer.anduril.com for third-party integration with Lattice. This is intentional and documented (Fern-built docs, OAuth 2.0, REST + gRPC, Entity Manager + Task Manager APIs). The portal even publishes /llms.txt and /llms-full.txt for AI-agent consumption.

This is research context, not a finding. The existence of a public Lattice API confirms the platform’s “open SDK for autonomous-system integration” positioning.

What Is Held Until Acknowledgment

Out of respect for an active coordinated-disclosure window, the following are not in the public repo until Anduril acknowledges and a reasonable remediation window has passed:

• IP-level cluster inventory (auth/SRE/load-test cluster naming and per-IP attribution)
• Cluster topology pattern (per-node multi-AZ deployment shape)
• Specific subdomain enumeration list beyond what is already public via CT logs
• Targeted Shodan dorks for individual Anduril production tiers (cluster-level cert SANs, etc.)

These are documented in the disclosure pack. They will be redacted into the public case study only after acknowledgment + remediation, with operational detail trimmed to what is already public via CT/Shodan.

Disclosure

• Recipient: disclosures@anduril.com (per security.txt)
• GPG fingerprint: 67EE B1A4 05BF 0A0A F0A7 EB35 5477 1229 1AE1 D9DF (their published key)
• Sent: 2026-05-09
• Timeline: 90 days standard; happy to extend if Telefonica coordination requires
• Status: awaiting acknowledgment