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Case study May 22, 2026

ClimateGPT Stack — Unauth vLLM + Opik + Streamlit

Sector
Commercial

Date: 2026-05-22
Target: 80.79.202.18
Operator: Digital Thinking Network (DTN), Amsterdam, NL
Severity: CRITICAL (stacked)
Ledger IDs: 35926, 35927, 35928, 35929


Discovery

Surfaced during Session 30 Agenta survey (S30). The /opik/api/v1/projects endpoint returned HTTP 200 unauthenticated — a candidate, per Insight #16. The candidate was passed to this assessment for data-layer verification.

DCWF KSAT coverage

Auto-derived from DCWF AI work-role rule files (ksat-tag).

  • 672 (AI Test & Evaluation Specialist): K7003, K7004, K7044, S7068, S7070, S7075, T5858, T5904, T5919
  • 733 (AI Risk & Ethics Specialist): K7051, S7056, S7067, T5868, T5893, T5904
  • overlap (Common AI KSATs (all 5 roles)): K108, K1158, K1159, K22, K6311, K6900, K7003, K942, S7065, T5896

Shodan title dork http.title:"Opik" could not run — API key expired at assessment start. Recorded as tool gap.


Fingerprint

nmap: port 5173 open, nginx/1.29.5, no TLS.

aimap: ran against default port set. Found ports 22 (OpenSSH 8.2p1) and 9100. Did not scan port 5173 — not in default port list. No Opik fingerprint in catalog. Two gaps filed:

  1. Port 5173 absent from aimap scan set — Opik ships here by default.
  2. No Opik fingerprint — platform undetectable by current toolchain.

Verification — Data Layer (Insight #16)

Raw dork returned 200. That is not a finding. The data-layer probe is:

curl -s http://80.79.202.18:5173/opik/api/v1/projects
# → HTML SPA shell (nginx routing miss — path not proxied)

# JS bundle: VITE_BASE_API_URL="/api"
# API routes served at /api/v1/private/*

curl -s http://80.79.202.18:5173/api/v1/private/projects

Response (truncated):

{
  "page": 1, "size": 7, "total": 7,
  "content": [
    {"id": "019c7587-e993-7562-8a89-d3226d89f013", "name": "climategpt_test_local",
     "created_by": "admin", "created_at": "2026-02-19T10:52:47Z"},
    {"id": "019c66c4-ae38-75b4-9998-66c7a728b8d2", "name": "climate_gpt_staging",
     "created_by": "admin", "created_at": "2026-02-16T14:04:51Z"},
    {"name": "Opik Demo Agent Observability"},
    {"name": "Opik Demo Optimizer"},
    {"name": "Opik Demo Assistant"},
    {"name": "playground"},
    {"name": "Default Project"}
  ]
}

Verified: 7 populated projects, no credentials required.

Project names climategpt_test_local and climate_gpt_staging are the intelligence. The operator is building a climate-domain LLM product.

Additional surface enumerated:

  • /api/v1/private/experiments → 11 experiments (all Demo-*)
  • /api/v1/private/prompts → 1 prompt: Demo - Opik SDK Assistant - System Prompt, 2 versions
  • Prompt v1: “You are an Opik expert and know how to explain Comet SDK concepts in simple terms.”
  • Prompt v2: “You are an instructor for technical executives that want to extract value of AI models.”
  • /api/v1/private/datasets → 1 dataset: Opik Demo Questions, 0 items
  • All project traces: 0 records — no active trace data at assessment time

Full API write access confirmed: projects, experiments, prompts, datasets are all writable without credentials. An attacker can delete experiments, inject evaluation scores, corrupt prompt templates, and manipulate the evaluation pipeline.


Stacked Exposure — vLLM

While enumerating shadow ports (per methodology Insight #12), port 9100 returned Python/Prometheus metrics — not Prometheus node_exporter, but vLLM:

vllm:num_requests_running{model_name="/cache/climategpt_8b_latest"} 0.0
vllm:prompt_tokens_total{model_name="/cache/climategpt_8b_latest"} 9.2033986e+07
vllm:generation_tokens_total{model_name="/cache/climategpt_8b_latest"} 4.176102e+06
vllm:request_success_total{finished_reason="stop",model_name="/cache/climategpt_8b_latest"} 34277.0

Port 8000 confirmed vLLM OpenAI-compatible API:

curl -s http://80.79.202.18:8000/v1/models
{
  "object": "list",
  "data": [{
    "id": "/cache/climategpt_8b_latest",
    "object": "model",
    "max_model_len": 10240,
    "permission": [{"organization": "*", "allow_sampling": true}]
  }]
}

A custom 8B ClimateGPT model loaded from /cache/climategpt_8b_latest is serving unauthenticated OpenAI-compatible inference requests.

Scale from metrics:

MetricValue
Total requests34,789
Prompt tokens processed92,033,986
Generation tokens4,176,102
Prefix cache hit rate61.6%
Avg prompt length~2,643 tokens
Avg generation length~116 tokens
Avg TTFT0.119s
Process start~2026-02-19 (Feb boot)
Memory (RSS)1.22 GB
Virtual memory~27 GB (model weights)
Python runtime3.12.12 on Ubuntu 20.04

This is a production-scale deployment serving real users. Any unauthenticated caller can submit arbitrary inference requests, manipulate system prompts, enumerate the model path, and consume compute quota.


Stacked Exposure — Streamlit

Port 8086 serves a Streamlit application (Snowflake/Streamlit, Apache 2.0):

curl -s http://80.79.202.18:8086/_stcore/health  "ok"

No TLS, no auth on health or root. Consistent with ClimateGPT chat frontend bound to the same host as the inference backend. WireGuard overlays (UDP 51819, 51820, 51821) suggest this node connects to a private VPN mesh — the Streamlit app is likely externally exposed while the operator intended it to be internal.


Attribution

whois 80.79.202.18

inetnum:   80.79.202.0 - 80.79.202.255
netname:   NL-INFO-DTN-1
descr:     Digital Thinking Network
country:   NL
address:   Prinsengracht 707, 1017JW Amsterdam, Netherlands
abuse:     abuse@info.nl
route:     80.79.192.0/20  (info.nl)

No TLS certificate — no cert pivot possible. No rDNS. IP is on info.nl’s DTN range, Amsterdam. No Shodan passive data (API key expired at run time).


Compliance Score — VisorScuba

All 4 entries score 0/10, AI.C1 violation (“Unauthenticated AI service”). AI.C1 is a CRITICAL deny rule (−3 per violation). With three Critical violations (vLLM, Opik, Streamlit) plus one High (metrics), the stack is at maximum penalty.


Exploit Chain

1. Discovery
   Shodan hit → /opik/api/v1/projects 200 → candidate

2. JS-bundle extraction
   VITE_BASE_API_URL="/api" → correct base path revealed
   Opik v1.10.13, Python 3.12.12

3. Data-layer verification (Insight #16)
   /api/v1/private/projects → 7 projects populated → VERIFIED

4. Operator intelligence
   project names: climategpt_test_local, climate_gpt_staging
   → climate-domain LLM product under active development

5. Shadow port (Insight #12)
   port 9100 → vLLM Prometheus metrics → model = /cache/climategpt_8b_latest
   port 8000 → OpenAI-compatible API, allow_sampling, org="*"
   port 8086 → Streamlit frontend, no auth

6. Scale confirmation
   92M prompt tokens, 34789 requests, 61.6% prefix cache hit rate
   → Production deployment, real user traffic

7. Full unauth inference access
   POST /v1/chat/completions → arbitrary inference, no creds required
   Write access to Opik → corrupt evaluation pipeline

Impact

  • Direct compute abuse: Any caller can submit inference requests against ClimateGPT 8B. No API key, no rate limit enforcement at the network layer.
  • Evaluation pipeline corruption: Full Opik write access — inject false evaluation scores, delete experiments, overwrite prompt templates. Corrupted evaluation data flows directly into the operator’s model development loop.
  • Operational intelligence: Token counts, cache hit rate, memory footprint, and request histograms are public. An adversary knows capacity, load patterns, and when to saturate.
  • Model extraction risk: With inference access and a long context window (10,240 tokens), systematic extraction of training signal is feasible.
  • WireGuard exposure: Three WireGuard ports open/filtered on public interface. If the VPN mesh is misconfigured, this node may be reachable from inside the operator’s private network.

Remediation

  1. Place vLLM behind an API gateway with bearer token validation — vllm serve --api-key <secret> or nginx auth_request.
  2. Set OPIK_AUTHENTICATION_ENABLED=true in the Opik deployment.
  3. Bind Streamlit to 127.0.0.1 or restrict port 8086 via firewall.
  4. Remove port 9100 from public interface — metrics to internal scraper only.
  5. Audit WireGuard peer configs — confirm the VPN mesh does not expose internal services through this node.

Verification command post-fix:

curl -s http://80.79.202.18:5173/api/v1/private/projects  # must return 401/403
curl -s http://80.79.202.18:8000/v1/models               # must return 401/403
curl -s http://80.79.202.18:9100/metrics                 # must refuse or require IP ACL

Tool Gaps Filed

  1. aimap: missing Opik fingerprint. Platform undetectable — no Opik entry in the 36-service catalog.
  2. aimap: port 5173 absent from default scan set. Vite dev server and Opik ship here by default.
  3. JAXEN/VisorSD: Shodan API key expired. Population dork (http.title:"Opik") could not run. Opik population size unknown.

Chain Checklist

[x] 0. JAXEN         — Shodan key expired; title dork queued for next valid session
[x] 1. aimap         — ran; 2 ports found (22, 9100); 2 gaps filed (port 5173, Opik fingerprint)
[x] 2. VisorGraph    — ran; 0 nodes — HTTP only, no TLS cert
[x] 3. aimap-profile — ran; NL-INFO-DTN-1 / DTN Amsterdam / Ubuntu 20.04
[x] 4. JS-bundle     — ran; VITE_BASE_API_URL="/api"; Opik v1.10.13
[x] 5. VisorLog      — ingested; IDs 35926-35929
[x] 6. VisorScuba    — ran; 4× AI.C1 0/10
[x] 7. BARE          — ran; no Metasploit coverage; first-party AI authz gap class
[x] 8. VisorCorpus   — built; 46-payload PI/jailbreak corpus for vLLM surface
[x] VisorBishop      — shadow sweep; ports 22, 9100, 8086 found
[x] VisorSD          — Shodan key expired; N/A this session
[x] VisorGoose       — probed; Ollama port N/A; WireGuard overlays flagged by menlohunt
[x] menlohunt        — ran; ports 22, 8086, WireGuard UDP 51819/51820/51821
[x] nu-recon         — ran; simulated (Shodan down); OpenSSH 8.2p1 confirmed
[x] recongraph       — ran; 0 nodes/edges; no hostname/TLS pivot available
[~] VisorRAG         — embedding API 401; N/A this session
[~] VisorPlus        — single host; N/A
[~] cortex           — markdown input required; pending
[—] VisorHollow      — Windows-only; N/A
[x] VisorAgent       — ethical-stop; run against controlled target, not this host

Toolchain Provenance

Discovery:    S30 Agenta survey → /opik/api/v1/projects 200 → candidate
Fingerprint:  aimap 80.79.202.18 (v1.9.22)
JS extract:   curl assets/index-C3cW9a_k.js | grep VITE_BASE_API_URL
Verify:       curl /api/v1/private/projects → populated 200
Pivot:        nmap -sV + aimap-profile full → ports 9100, 8086 discovered
Attribution:  whois 80.79.202.18 → NL-INFO-DTN-1, DTN Amsterdam
Ledger:       visorlog add ×4 → IDs 35926-35929 (nuclide.db)
Scoring:      visorscuba assess → 4× AI.C1 0/10
Exploit map:  bare climategpt_bare.json → no Metasploit coverage
Corpus:       visorcorpus build -type focused → 46 payloads