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Case study May 1, 2026

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech): DHCP Node

Sector
Universities
Country
va

NuClide Research · 2026-05-01


Summary

Virginia Tech has at least 4 Ollama-running IPs in Shodan; only h80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu (128.173.243.8) responds publicly. The DHCP hostname indicates a desktop or workstation on the campus DHCP pool rather than a dedicated server. 5 models, no cloud proxies.


Infrastructure

FieldValue
IP128.173.243.8
Hostnameh80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu
OrganizationVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ.
CountryUnited States (Virginia)
Open ports11434 (Ollama, public)

Additional VT IPs in Shodan (198.82.9.219, 198.82.11.101, 198.82.13.6) did not respond, likely firewalled or offline.


Model Inventory

ModelSize
smollm2:135m0.3GB
qwen3:30b18.6GB
qwen:latest2.3GB
qwen2.5:32b19.9GB
llama3.2:latest2.0GB

Findings

F1: Researcher Workstation Publicly Exposed (LOW)

DHCP hostname pattern (h80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu) indicates a laptop or desktop on campus DHCP. No cloud proxies, no credential leak. Standard unauthenticated Ollama exposure on a workstation.

F2: CVE-2025-63389 Injectable (HIGH)

All models injectable via unauthenticated /api/create.


Remediation

OLLAMA_HOST=127.0.0.1:11434
systemctl restart ollama

Disclosure

  • Discovered: 2026-05-01
  • Status: Pending outreach to VT IT Security (vt.edu)

Second host (2026-05-19 .edu sweep): hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu

A second VT-attributed host appeared during the 2026-05-19 .edu LLM-infra survey wave-1, running Open WebUI on a DHCP-assigned IP within VT’s institutional range.

Infrastructure

FieldValue
IP198.82.182.245
rDNShc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu (DHCP-assigned hostname pattern)
Second hostnameoffice.scholars.bond (resolves to same IP — third-party domain pointing into VT’s network, see note below)
Org (WHOIS)Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ. (OrgName: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., NetName: VPI-BLK, CIDR 198.82.0.0/16)
CityPrices Fork, VA
Open ports observed80 (Apache 2.4.58), 3000 (Open WebUI uvicorn) — Shodan reports 4 ports total; client-side direct probes to :80 returned connection-reset (likely ACL filtering my IP), Shodan sees it

Observations — Open WebUI v0.6.26

GET http://hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu:3000/api/config returned 200 with:

{
  "status": true,
  "name": "Open WebUI",
  "version": "0.6.26",
  "default_locale": "",
  "oauth": {"providers": {}},
  "features": {
    "auth": true,
    "auth_trusted_header": false,
    "enable_signup_password_confirmation": false,
    "enable_ldap": false,
    "enable_api_key": true,
    "enable_signup": true,
    "enable_login_form": true,
    "enable_websocket": true,
    "enable_version_update_check": true
  }
}

Class memberships observed:

  • enable_signup: true — public self-registration class OBSERVED
  • enable_api_key: true — post-authentication API-key minting enabled
  • Combined: signup-open AND post-auth API-key minting both enabled means an attacker can self-register AND then self-mint API keys that bypass UI controls. This is a layered exposure not present on hosts with only one or the other flag.
  • enable_ldap: false, no OIDC providers

Notable details — office.scholars.bond second hostname

Shodan’s hostname collection shows two distinct hostnames resolving to 198.82.182.245:

  • hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu — VT’s institutional DHCP naming convention
  • office.scholars.bond — third-party domain registered under the .bond TLD (generic-TLD, sometimes used for casual/personal sites, dynamic DNS providers, or vanity domains)

The .bond TLD has no inherent meaning. Most plausible: a researcher or staff member at VT pointed a personal/vanity domain at their DHCP-assigned VT workstation IP. The Apache on :80 may be serving a different vhost depending on the Host header (the :80 redirect behavior visible in Shodan history vs the connection-reset to my direct probe suggests vhost-based routing or ACL).

Cross-tool confirmations

  • aimap -ports-class llm-gateway — surfaced Open WebUI service classification
  • visorbishop (post-G5 fix) — tool-internal output: open-webui auth=signup-open severity=critical with api_keys_enabled: True, signup_open: True indicators (this host is the cleanest demonstration of the layered exposure)
  • Direct /api/config probe — verified independently
  • Shodan host record — confirms 4 open ports (with the Apache on :80 visible in Shodan’s scan path that I couldn’t reach from my client)

Class-membership summary (no tier labels per survey convention)

  • Open WebUI signup-open class — OBSERVED
  • Post-auth API-key minting class — OBSERVED
  • Combined “signup-open + API-key minting” elevation class — OBSERVED (layered: signup grants account, account grants API key, API key bypasses UI controls)
  • Multi-hostname (DHCP + vanity-TLD) class — OBSERVED

Data-membership (specific signup, specific API-key generation, specific elevation flow) not tested per restraint ethic.

Source artifacts

  • Workspace: ~/recon/edu-llm-infra-2026-05-19/
  • Initial probe: arsenal-out/critical-openwebui-results.json (VT section)
  • WHOIS: arsenal-out/whois-5-confirmed.txt
  • Shodan host data: arsenal-out/shodan-host-vt.txt (shows both hostnames + the connection-resetting Apache on :80)
  • visorbishop wave-1 revalidation: stage2-wave2/arsenal/visorbishop-wave1-revalidate.json (VT entry with api_keys_enabled: True, signup_open: True indicators)