Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech): DHCP Node
NuClide Research · 2026-05-01
Summary
Virginia Tech has at least 4 Ollama-running IPs in Shodan; only h80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu (128.173.243.8) responds publicly. The DHCP hostname indicates a desktop or workstation on the campus DHCP pool rather than a dedicated server. 5 models, no cloud proxies.
Infrastructure
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IP | 128.173.243.8 |
| Hostname | h80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu |
| Organization | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ. |
| Country | United States (Virginia) |
| Open ports | 11434 (Ollama, public) |
Additional VT IPs in Shodan (198.82.9.219, 198.82.11.101, 198.82.13.6) did not respond, likely firewalled or offline.
Model Inventory
| Model | Size |
|---|---|
smollm2:135m | 0.3GB |
qwen3:30b | 18.6GB |
qwen:latest | 2.3GB |
qwen2.5:32b | 19.9GB |
llama3.2:latest | 2.0GB |
Findings
F1: Researcher Workstation Publicly Exposed (LOW)
DHCP hostname pattern (h80adf308.dhcp.vt.edu) indicates a laptop or desktop on campus DHCP. No cloud proxies, no credential leak. Standard unauthenticated Ollama exposure on a workstation.
F2: CVE-2025-63389 Injectable (HIGH)
All models injectable via unauthenticated /api/create.
Remediation
OLLAMA_HOST=127.0.0.1:11434
systemctl restart ollama
Disclosure
- Discovered: 2026-05-01
- Status: Pending outreach to VT IT Security (vt.edu)
Second host (2026-05-19 .edu sweep): hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu
A second VT-attributed host appeared during the 2026-05-19 .edu LLM-infra survey wave-1, running Open WebUI on a DHCP-assigned IP within VT’s institutional range.
Infrastructure
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IP | 198.82.182.245 |
| rDNS | hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu (DHCP-assigned hostname pattern) |
| Second hostname | office.scholars.bond (resolves to same IP — third-party domain pointing into VT’s network, see note below) |
| Org (WHOIS) | Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ. (OrgName: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ., NetName: VPI-BLK, CIDR 198.82.0.0/16) |
| City | Prices Fork, VA |
| Open ports observed | 80 (Apache 2.4.58), 3000 (Open WebUI uvicorn) — Shodan reports 4 ports total; client-side direct probes to :80 returned connection-reset (likely ACL filtering my IP), Shodan sees it |
Observations — Open WebUI v0.6.26
GET http://hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu:3000/api/config returned 200 with:
{
"status": true,
"name": "Open WebUI",
"version": "0.6.26",
"default_locale": "",
"oauth": {"providers": {}},
"features": {
"auth": true,
"auth_trusted_header": false,
"enable_signup_password_confirmation": false,
"enable_ldap": false,
"enable_api_key": true,
"enable_signup": true,
"enable_login_form": true,
"enable_websocket": true,
"enable_version_update_check": true
}
}
Class memberships observed:
enable_signup: true— public self-registration class OBSERVEDenable_api_key: true— post-authentication API-key minting enabled- Combined: signup-open AND post-auth API-key minting both enabled means an attacker can self-register AND then self-mint API keys that bypass UI controls. This is a layered exposure not present on hosts with only one or the other flag.
enable_ldap: false, no OIDC providers
Notable details — office.scholars.bond second hostname
Shodan’s hostname collection shows two distinct hostnames resolving to 198.82.182.245:
hc652b6f5.dhcp.vt.edu— VT’s institutional DHCP naming conventionoffice.scholars.bond— third-party domain registered under the.bondTLD (generic-TLD, sometimes used for casual/personal sites, dynamic DNS providers, or vanity domains)
The .bond TLD has no inherent meaning. Most plausible: a researcher or staff member at VT pointed a personal/vanity domain at their DHCP-assigned VT workstation IP. The Apache on :80 may be serving a different vhost depending on the Host header (the :80 redirect behavior visible in Shodan history vs the connection-reset to my direct probe suggests vhost-based routing or ACL).
Cross-tool confirmations
aimap -ports-class llm-gateway— surfaced Open WebUI service classificationvisorbishop(post-G5 fix) — tool-internal output:open-webui auth=signup-open severity=criticalwithapi_keys_enabled: True, signup_open: Trueindicators (this host is the cleanest demonstration of the layered exposure)- Direct
/api/configprobe — verified independently - Shodan host record — confirms 4 open ports (with the Apache on :80 visible in Shodan’s scan path that I couldn’t reach from my client)
Class-membership summary (no tier labels per survey convention)
- Open WebUI signup-open class — OBSERVED
- Post-auth API-key minting class — OBSERVED
- Combined “signup-open + API-key minting” elevation class — OBSERVED (layered: signup grants account, account grants API key, API key bypasses UI controls)
- Multi-hostname (DHCP + vanity-TLD) class — OBSERVED
Data-membership (specific signup, specific API-key generation, specific elevation flow) not tested per restraint ethic.
Source artifacts
- Workspace:
~/recon/edu-llm-infra-2026-05-19/ - Initial probe:
arsenal-out/critical-openwebui-results.json(VT section) - WHOIS:
arsenal-out/whois-5-confirmed.txt - Shodan host data:
arsenal-out/shodan-host-vt.txt(shows both hostnames + the connection-resetting Apache on :80) - visorbishop wave-1 revalidation:
stage2-wave2/arsenal/visorbishop-wave1-revalidate.json(VT entry withapi_keys_enabled: True, signup_open: Trueindicators)