Cn Hooper Erp 2026 05 17
Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com
2026-05-17
Re: Unauthenticated Elasticsearch with AI/RAG workload, Hooper ERP (chatbiz.hooperp.com, ‘Hoop AI’)
IP / Host: 123.60.173.230 (cluster docker-cluster (bad5d40a4f45))
Severity: HIGH
I’m an independent security researcher conducting good-faith AI infrastructure research under the NuClide Research umbrella (CISA disclosures CVE-2025-4364, ICSA-25-140-11). This is an unsolicited coordinated disclosure. No engagement exists with your organization. I have not read, modified, or exfiltrated documents. Only index metadata (schema, counts, sizes) needed to identify the exposure.
Summary
The Elasticsearch endpoint at http://123.60.173.230:9200 is reachable from the public internet with no authentication. The cluster carries one or more AI / RAG workloads (dense_vector or knn_vector fields). TLS SAN includes chatbiz.hooperp.com (Hooper ERP BI inventory chatbot).
State (verified 2026-05-17): FULLY WIPED. Extortion marker present, no business data remaining
Infrastructure
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| IP | 123.60.173.230 |
| ES version | Elasticsearch 8.18.2 |
| Cluster name | docker-cluster (bad5d40a4f45) |
| Country | China |
| Hosting | Huawei Cloud |
Already wiped (per attacker, between morning probe and second probe today)
| Index | Docs / prior state | Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
hooper_bi_dws_inventory (deleted) | — | — | 1536d ERP inventory chatbot data — was alive this morning, now gone |
Extortion marker
An index named read_me is present on the cluster. This is the calling card of the Meow / Indexrm extortion campaign, an automated wipe-and-ransom operation. The marker indicates the attacker has already enumerated your cluster and either has wiped the data or is about to.
Sample marker content typically contains a ransom note pointing to a Bitcoin wallet and an email channel (wendy.etabw@gmx.com or one of two clone actor channels, scandal@onionmail.org, db-recovery@sharebot.net). We have separately reported all three channels to abuse contacts.
Do not pay. Our wallet-blockchain analysis (mempool.space) shows only ~5 victims across thousands of marked hosts have paid; the wallet has received roughly 0.018 BTC against a population of 4,400+ marked instances. Paying does not get your data back. The campaign is wipe-first, ransom-as-afterthought.
Why it matters
Earlier today (2026-05-17 morning UTC) this cluster carried index ‘hooper_bi_dws_inventory’ with 1536-dimensional dense_vector embeddings. Your BI inventory chatbot’s knowledge base. Within 12 hours the attacker has completed the wipe. Only the ‘read_me’ extortion marker remains.
One-line fix
Bind the Elasticsearch HTTP listener to the loopback interface and require authentication for any non-local client. For a Docker deployment:
docker run -p 127.0.0.1:9200:9200 -e xpack.security.enabled=true elasticsearch:8.18.2If the cluster is on a host network: set network.host: 127.0.0.1 in elasticsearch.yml, restart, then put it behind a reverse proxy or VPN with authentication.
For OpenSearch clusters: enable the security plugin with plugins.security.disabled: false.
Reference
Companion case study with the full 22-host survey: AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/case-studies/commercial/22-ai-stack-attribution-2026-05-17.md
Companion methodology notes:
- Snapshot vs delta measurement (Insight #29)
- WHOIS over slug heuristics for disclosure routing (Insight #04)
Happy to provide additional forensic detail if useful. No response is required.
Regards, Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com