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HIGH · Disclosure May 4, 2026

If served by FastMCP / uvicorn:

To: abuse@akamai.com, abuse@ovh.net Cc: support@casdoor.org, abuse@nuclide-research.com Subject: Three unauthenticated Casdoor MCP servers (OAuth application-CRUD) across providers, recurring template-auth-off pattern


Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com

2026-05-04

Re: Three unauthenticated Casdoor MCP Server v1.0.0 instances exposing 5-tool OAuth/IAM application-CRUD IPs / Hosts:

  • 139.162.50.110:8888 (Linode US, Akamai)
  • 141.95.127.178:8000 (OVH France)
  • 51.195.82.158:8000 (OVH France)

Severity: HIGH (each individually); recurring-pattern severity is the upstream concern


I’m an independent security researcher conducting good-faith AI infrastructure research under the NuClide Research umbrella (CISA disclosures CVE-2025-4364, ICSA-25-140-11). This is an unsolicited coordinated-disclosure notification routed to:

  1. Akamai abuse (for the Linode-hosted instance)
  2. OVH abuse (for the two OVH-hosted instances)
  3. Casdoor maintainers (CC), because the recurring pattern across three independent operators suggests a template-auth-off-by-default issue worth addressing upstream

Summary

Three instances of Casdoor MCP Server v1.0.0 were independently identified during NuClide Research’s MCP cross-cloud survey (2026-05-04). All three return identical responses to JSON-RPC initialize and expose 5 tools without authentication:

get_applications, get_application, add_application,
update_application, delete_application

Casdoor is an OAuth 2.0 / SSO identity-as-a-service platform (casdoor.org). The MCP server wraps Casdoor’s application-management API, i.e., the registration of OAuth applications that authenticate users into the operator’s services. An attacker with unauth access can:

  • Enumerate all OAuth applications registered with the operator’s Casdoor instance
  • Modify application configurations including redirectUris, the URL OAuth tokens are returned to. Pointing redirectUris at attacker-controlled infrastructure is an account-takeover primitive for any user who initiates the OAuth flow
  • Delete applications, breaking the operator’s authentication

That all three operators independently deployed the same template with the same auth-off-default suggests the upstream Casdoor MCP template ships without auth on tools/list invocation. Three is a small sample but the pattern is striking enough to warrant Casdoor maintainers reviewing the template’s default auth posture.

Found during NuClide Research’s MCP cross-cloud survey. Full case study: AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/case-studies/commercial/mcp-cloud-survey-2026-05.md (search for “F7, Casdoor MCP Server”).

Confirmed exposure (each host)

POST / (JSON-RPC) returns valid initialize response with serverInfo: {"name": "Casdoor MCP Server", "version": "1.0.0"}. tools/list returns the 5-tool list above. Verification was non-destructive: only initialize and tools/list were called.

Remediation (operator)

Bind the MCP transport to localhost or restrict via firewall:

# If served by FastMCP / uvicorn:
uvicorn casdoor_mcp:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port <8888 or 8000>

# Or firewall:
ufw deny <port>/tcp
ufw allow from <admin-IP> to any port <port>

If the MCP integration is needed for AI client tooling, route through a reverse proxy with API-key auth at the proxy layer.

Recommendation (Casdoor maintainers)

Consider auditing the Casdoor MCP server template’s default auth posture. If the template ships tools/list invocation without auth gating by default, the recurring pattern across operator deployments is a predictable consequence, three operators in our sample, likely many more we haven’t surveyed. An auth-on default would prevent the population-scale exposure.

Reference

Full case study + cross-cloud MCP survey context: AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/case-studies/commercial/mcp-cloud-survey-2026-05.md

I’m happy to answer questions or assist with verification on any of the three hosts.

Regards, Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT