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CRITICAL · Disclosure May 6, 2026

Bind to localhost or restrict at firewall

Bill Rondell, Nick Adams & Dade Murphy — May 6, 2026 — critical · disclosure — 2 min read — 520 words

To: abuse@ovh.net Cc: security@alcy.fr, abuse@nuclide-research.com Subject: Follow-up, Unauthenticated Alcy CRM MCP server still live (188.165.203.72:8000); 2026-05-04 cc to contact@alcy.fr bounced

Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com

2026-05-06

Re: Follow-up to 2026-05-04 disclosure of unauthenticated Alcy MCP Simple v3.2.0 server IP / Host: 188.165.203.72 (rDNS ns310744.ovh.net, OVH dedicated server, France) Severity: CRITICAL Reference: Original disclosure thread sent to abuse@ovh.net on 2026-05-04 (subject: “Unauthenticated Alcy CRM MCP server (22-tool customer/work-order CRUD) on OVH dedicated server, 188.165.203.72:8000”)

This is a follow-up to the 2026-05-04 coordinated-disclosure notification regarding 188.165.203.72:8000. Two new pieces of context warrant a re-touch:

1. The original cc: contact@alcy.fr address bounced. That guess-address did not deliver, so the operator-side notification did not reach Alcy SAS. I am re-sending with cc: security@alcy.fr (re-resolved via WHOIS + pattern-guess against the alcy.fr MX record). If security@alcy.fr also bounces, the operator-direct path is OVH’s customer-notification channel, please consider this email an explicit request to forward to the OVH customer who controls IP 188.165.203.72.

2. The exposure remains live as of 2026-05-06. Re-probe today confirms Alcy MCP Simple v3.2.0 still responds to initialize and tools/list without authentication, exposing the same 22 tools (15 read, 7 mutate, including create_ticket, create_ordre_mission, create_intervention, patch_ticket, patch_ordre_mission, patch_intervention).

Original technical detail and reproduction steps: AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/case-studies/commercial/mcp-cloud-survey-2026-05.md (search “F0a, Alcy MCP Simple”)

Original disclosure draft (with full tool list, mutation surface analysis, and remediation steps): AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/disclosures/OVH-188-165-203-72-alcy-crm.md

Summary (refresher)

An OVH dedicated-server customer at 188.165.203.72:8000 is running an unauthenticated Model Context Protocol (MCP) server identifying itself as Alcy MCP Simple v3.2.0. The server exposes 22 tools mapping to admin operations on what appears to be a deployment of alcy.fr, a French field-service / facility-management SaaS, as a JSON-RPC API readable + writable by any unauthenticated internet caller.

Mutate tools (record creation + modification):

  • add_evt, patch_ticket, patch_ordre_mission, patch_intervention
  • create_ticket, create_ordre_mission, create_intervention

Read tools (CRM data exfil):

  • search_clients, search_installations, search_ordre_mission, search_intervention, search_contact, search_user, search_agence, search_ticket, search_produit, search_installation_produit, search_contrat_produit, search_intervention_produit, search_evts, get_entity_history, get_server_datetime

For a French customer-facing SaaS, this constitutes a significant data-protection / GDPR-relevant exposure. The mutation primitives elevate this to CRITICAL, an unauthenticated attacker can inject fake work orders, modify existing tickets, or alter intervention records without leaving an audit trail attributable to a specific user.

Remediation (for the customer)

# Bind to localhost or restrict at firewall
uvicorn alcy_mcp:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
# or
ufw deny 8000/tcp
ufw allow from <admin-IP> to any port 8000

For AI-client integration, route through a reverse proxy with API-key auth at the proxy layer, the MCP protocol itself does not require auth at the transport, so auth-on-default is the operator’s responsibility.

Outstanding action (OVH side)

Per OVH’s standard abuse-handling process, customer notification typically requires either:

  1. OVH’s internal customer-notification channel (acting on this email), OR
  2. Submission via the OVH abuse web form at https://www.ovh.com/abuse/

If a web-form submission is required to advance customer notification, please indicate that in reply and I will fill the form with the same case content.

I’m available for any clarification or verification questions.

Regards, Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT