Reference
12. Container & Orchestration Infrastructure
Expanded in v2 · Section verified: April 2026
Modern AI stacks deploy container-first and k8s-first. The orchestration layer underneath the AI services is often the softer target, and compromise there gives you every workload on the cluster for free.
Docker Runtime
| Shodan Query | Notes |
|---|---|
"Docker" port:2375 "api" | Unauth Docker daemon, container escape + host RCE |
"Portainer" port:9000 | Default creds / signup-becomes-admin |
Artifact stores (Docker Registry v2, Harbor, MinIO) moved to §2 under Object Storage & Artifact Stores. This section covers container runtime and orchestration surface only.
Kubernetes
| Shodan Query | Notes |
|---|---|
port:6443 "kubernetes" "unauthorized" | API server reachable, auth enforced |
port:6443 "/api/v1" -"unauthorized" | Anonymous API access, full cluster read |
port:10250 "kubelet" | Anonymous kubelet = exec into any pod = cluster-wide RCE |
port:10255 "kubelet" | Read-only kubelet, pod/node enumeration |
port:2379 "etcd" | Unauth etcd = full cluster state, including secrets |
"etcd" "v3" port:2379 | |
"Rancher" port:8443 | |
"k3s" port:6443 | |
"Kubernetes Dashboard" port:30000 | Exposed dashboard, skip-login option historically |
Kubelet on 10250 with anonymous access enabled is functionally equivalent to cluster-wide RCE. The /exec and /run endpoints allow arbitrary command execution inside any pod on the node. This is still seen in the wild at material volume.
Supporting Infrastructure
| Shodan Query | Notes |
|---|---|
"Consul" port:8500 "/v1/catalog" | Service discovery, full topology |
"Vault" port:8200 "/v1/sys/health" | Auth required; reachable surface for attacks |
MinIO moved to §2 Object Storage & Artifact Stores.