Vector database population survey, 2026-05-17

NuClide Research, 2026-05-17 (overnight pass) Survey #22 in the AI infrastructure series.

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Summary

We surveyed the public vector-database population: Qdrant, Weaviate, Milvus, ChromaDB. Vector DBs hold the embeddings for an operator’s RAG pipeline. Every document, customer transcript, support ticket, legal record, or PII row the operator has chunked and indexed for retrieval. The Meow / Indexrm extortion campaign hits Elasticsearch only, so unlike yesterday’s ES population the vector-DB population is not wipe-contaminated. Operator data is alive.

DCWF KSAT coverage

Auto-derived from DCWF AI work-role rule files (ksat-tag).

• 672 (AI Test & Evaluation Specialist): K7003, K7004, K7044, S7068, S7070, S7075, T5858, T5904
• 733 (AI Risk & Ethics Specialist): K7040, S7067, T5854, T5868, T5882, T5893
• overlap (Common AI KSATs (all 5 roles)): K1157, K1158, K22, K6311, K6900, K6935, K7003, K942

From 917 candidate IPs harvested via protocol-strict Shodan dorks, aimap confirmed:

The Qdrant cohort is the most readable (the API exposes collection names + point counts at /collections). The Weaviate cohort is the most metadata-rich (the schema includes self-declared pii_fields markers). What follows is the headline-impact subset, schema-only enumeration, no document reads performed.

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Largest exposures by point count (Qdrant)

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advocat-online.ru: 214 million vector points

The single host at 89.108.123.166 (Reg.Ru hosting in Russia, TLS SAN advocat-online.ru) is the largest exposed vector store we have ever surveyed. The 18 collections describe a full Russian legal AI knowledge base:

The empty svo collection is notable. “SVO” is the Russian-government abbreviation for “Specialnaya Voennaya Operatsia”. The official term for the Russia-Ukraine war. An advocate-services platform with a dedicated empty SVO collection suggests anticipated legal-services demand for the conflict (military exemptions, casualty claims, conscription appeals).

Additional ports on the same host: PostgreSQL (5432), POP/IMAP/SMTP mail stack (110/143/465/995/25), Nacos config server (8848). Likely a full LAMP-style deployment with the vector DB sitting alongside the relational and mail layers.

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RefugeeContent on Weaviate (141.94.237.69)

Weaviate’s schema endpoint reports pii_fields as a per-property tag. One host carries this:

{
  "name": "RefugeeContent",
  "vectorizer": "none",
  "properties": 24,
  "objects": 1,
  "pii_fields": ["source_username", "geo_address", "geo_phones", "geo_emails"]
}

The schema is self-declared by the operator to contain refugee identity records with geolocated contact info. The class name RefugeeContent plus four PII fields covering geographic address, phone numbers, and email addresses is among the most sensitive PII categories possible. Refugees often face active persecution from state actors or non-state armed groups; geolocation data plus phone/email exposes them to direct contact attack vectors.

The host is on OVH France (vps-bbd11dc6.vps.ovh.net). Adjacent open ports include MongoDB (27017) and PostgreSQL (5432), both potentially carrying the underlying refugee records (Weaviate stores the embeddings; the source documents are typically in the relational DB).

Disclosure routing: OVH SAS abuse + cert-pivot to identify the operator. This is a humanitarian-emergency-class exposure.

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aishelter.underdog.my.id: Indonesian shelter HRIS

Indonesian host at 103.247.10.156 (Rumahweb Indonesia hosting, TLS SAN aishelter.underdog.my.id):

754,000 employee/payroll records across what appears to be an HR information system for a shelter network. “Shelter” in this naming convention typically refers to humanitarian / NGO / homeless / domestic-violence shelter organizations. Adjacent ports include MySQL (3306), suggesting the relational source data is on the same host.

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bolt.kaychalabs.com: Internal enterprise AI knowledge stack

204.10.144.25 (Revelex hosting, TLS SAN bolt.kaychalabs.com, prior cert kaycha-ai.revelex.com). 4.2M points across the “jarvis_*” naming pattern indicates a complete enterprise AI assistant:

jarvis_legal, jarvis_financial, jarvis_communications together imply the operator has embedded their internal legal, financial, and communications archives for AI retrieval. PostgreSQL (5432) is also open on this host.

Revelex is a travel-industry technology firm. Kaycha Labs appears to be the AI products arm.

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fridayai.online: 121-tenant SaaS exposure (148.113.212.12)

OVH Canada host, TLS SAN fridayai.online. 121 distinct workspace collections (ws-XXX UUIDs), plus a conversation_archive collection.

Largest workspaces:

The ws-XXX naming convention plus the count is the signature of a multi-tenant SaaS where each customer gets a workspace identifier. 121 customers’ RAG data exposed to the internet on a single Qdrant cluster.

Adjacent ports are alarming: MongoDB (27017), Redis (6379), kubelet (10250), exposed kubelet enables container-RCE on the Kubernetes node hosting all 121 workspaces. The data layer breach is one issue; the kubelet exposure means container escape to root on the cluster node is also reachable.

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vector.jezt.cloud: Multi-tenant SaaS, 264 collections

35.154.114.115 (AWS Mumbai, TLS SAN vector.jezt.cloud). 10.7M points across 264 collections. Many of the collection names look like daily snapshots (UV_special_1025_DDMMYYYY running January through April 2026) and template data (Json_data_NNNN, Unk_Rein_NNNN). The media_dubai_<uuid> collections imply a Dubai-region media/PR customer dataset.

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Weaviate cohort items (other than RefugeeContent)

The Weaviate schema endpoint’s pii_fields tagging revealed additional self-declared sensitive-data classes across the 127-host cohort:

The pii_fields declaration is a Weaviate schema feature operators opt into. Each of these hosts is a case where the operator has acknowledged in code that the class holds PII, and then exposed it without authentication. Twenty-three hosts in this Weaviate cohort had at least one class with non-empty pii_fields.

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Method

1. Shodan harvest: 6 protocol-strict dorks (http.html:"qdrant", product:"Weaviate", port:8080+weaviate, product:"Milvus", product:"Chroma", port:8000+chroma). Union: 917 candidates.
2. aimap port scan: 917 × 12 ports = 11,004 probe targets. 2,366 open ports surfaced.
3. aimap fingerprint: 699 service hits, 263 unique IPs identified across the four vendors.
4. Per-vendor deep enumeration: Qdrant /collections for point counts, Weaviate /v1/schema for collection schemas including pii_fields, ChromaDB /api/v1/collections, Milvus collection list.
5. Restraint: schema + metadata only. No _search, no query, no document reads. The class names and point counts are the finding.

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Disclosure pipeline

Three tiers:

Tier 1. Critical, single-instance, humanitarian or large-scale PII:

• 141.94.237.69 (RefugeeContent) → OVH abuse + operator-identification effort. Top priority.
• 103.247.10.156 (aishelter.underdog.my.id) → Rumahweb Indonesia abuse + operator. PII at scale.
• 148.113.212.12 (fridayai.online) → OVH Canada abuse + operator. 121 third-party customers affected; the operator must notify each.

Tier 2. Large but single-organization:

• 89.108.123.166 (advocat-online.ru) → Reg.Ru abuse + operator. Legal services data. Sensitive but single-operator.
• 204.10.144.25 (kaychalabs.com) → Revelex security + Kaycha Labs operator. Internal corporate.
• 20.127.155.10 (eclipseassistance.azure) → Microsoft Azure abuse + operator. Internal test data.

Tier 3. Weaviate PII-self-declared cohort (23 hosts):

• Batch report to each respective hosting provider (OVH, Hetzner, DigitalOcean, GCP, AWS) listing affected customer IPs with the per-class pii_fields declarations.

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Toolchain provenance

JAXEN         [x] 917 candidates from 6 protocol-strict dorks
aimap v1.9.11 [x] 699 service hits in 1h50m
visorgraph    [ ] queued — cert-pivot on top 10 for operator IDs
aimap-profile [ ] queued — classification for the 23 PII-flagged Weaviate hosts
visorscuba    [ ] queued — compliance scoring (GDPR / refugee privacy / payroll)
visorlog      [ ] queued ingest
classifier    [x] Insight #30 multi-port honeypot filter (zero honeypots in this corpus)

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See also

• mcp-server-survey-2026-05-17.md: sibling survey
• llm-gateway-survey-2026-05-17.md: sibling LLM-proxy survey
• ../../methodology/insight-30-multi-port-identical-responses-identify-honeypots.md